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Constitutional Constraints on
Electoral Reform in Canada:Why
Parliament is (Mostly) Free to
Implement a New Voting System
Emmett Macfarlane

I. INTRODUCTION
Having promised that the 2015 national election would be the last
conducted under the first-past-the-post (“FPTP”) electoral system, the
federal government has initiated efforts to find a replacement.1 A national
debate about the various alternatives to FPTP will undoubtedly continue,
but a fundamental issue concerns whether Parliament faces any constraints
on its authority to implement electoral reform. Two distinct concerns
present themselves. First, does a change to the electoral system require a
constitutional amendment, and if so, would such an amendment require
provincial consent under the general amending procedure in Part V of the
Constitution Act, 1982?2 Second, would certain electoral systems violate
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?3
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1
The Liberal Party of Canada made electoral reform a key plank in its 2015 election
campaign platform. The precise wording was as follows:
We are committed to ensuring that 2015 will be the last federal election conducted under
the first-past-the-post voting system.
We will convene an all-party Parliamentary committee to review a wide variety of reforms,
such as ranked ballots, proportional representation, mandatory voting, and online voting.
This committee will deliver its recommendations to Parliament. Within 18 months of
forming government, we will introduce legislation to enact electoral reform.
Liberal Party of Canada, A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class (2015), at 27.
2
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Constitution
Act, 1982”].
3
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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These questions are important not only for the prospects of federal
electoral reform, but also for their implications for the nature of
constitutional change in Canada. On the one hand, if Parliament does not
have the ability to alter the electoral system without provincial consent, it
would only further cement the degree to which the country suffers from a
constitutional paralysis, wherein both legal and political factors stifle the
prospects for any major constitutional reform.4 On the other hand, in its
reference opinion on Senate reform, the Supreme Court has recently
elaborated on the importance of changes to Canada’s “constitutional
architecture” and the federal principle embedded in the general amending
procedure that major changes affecting provincial interests ought to
require provincial consent.5 Similarly, democratic rights under the
Charter may be implicated by certain changes, not only in the event
particular electoral systems might affect the right to vote but also in
relation to the right “to be qualified” for membership in the House of
Commons or a provincial legislature under section 3. Existing
jurisprudence indicates that important rights  including the right to
effective representation and the right to meaningful participation in the
electoral process  are embedded within section 3. How might these
rights be implicated by electoral reform?
This article proposes to examine and answer these questions. I argue
in Part II of this article that while electoral reform might be regarded as a
change of a constitutional nature, Parliament is well within its authority
under section 44 of the amending formula to effect changes excepting
ones that directly implicate provincial interests  specifically, the
principle of proportional provincial representation in the House and the
guarantees of the minimum number of seats to which each province is
entitled. A key factor in considering electoral reform’s implications for
the constitutional architecture, I argue, is the distinct role of the House as
an institution representing the national will in contrast to the regionallycomposed Senate. Any analysis of provincial interests in the functioning
of the House must consider the limits of those interests given the distinct
nature of representation within a bicameral legislature.

4
For more on this, see: Emmett Macfarlane, ed., Constitutional Amendment in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016); Richard Albert, “The Difficulty of Constitutional
Amendment in Canada” (2015) 53(1) Alberta L. Rev. 85; Richard Albert, “Constructive Unamendability
in Canada and the United States” (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 181.
5
Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704, 2014 SCC 32
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reference re Senate Reform”].
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Part III examines the implications of electoral reform for democratic
rights under the Charter. While certain changes might implicate democratic
rights under the Charter, I argue that none of the electoral systems likely to
be considered would violate rights in an unreasonable manner. The most
relevant section 3 jurisprudence explicitly acknowledges the multiple
values and purposes that Parliament might consider in designing laws of
democracy, including in relation to the electoral system itself. While
extreme reform options might run up against democratic rights guarantees,
Parliament should expect considerable latitude to implement electoral
reform. I then briefly discuss the implications of this analysis in Part IV.

II. ELECTORAL REFORM AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
1. Does Electoral Reform Count as Constitutional Change?
The constitutional amending formula is contained in Part V of the
Constitution Act, 1982, and it sets out no fewer than five procedures for
changes to the Constitution.6 Amendments under the general procedure
of section 38 require resolutions of the House of Commons and the
Senate and at least seven provinces representing at least 50 per cent
of the population. In addition to this default procedure, the formula
includes: the unanimity procedure (section 41), which lists a set of
matters requiring the support of all 10 provinces; the bilateral procedure
(section 43), where changes affecting certain provinces but not others
may be made by resolutions of the House and Senate and the legislative
assembly of each province to which the amendment applies; section 44,
which allows Parliament to exclusively make laws in relation to the
federal executive or the Senate and House of Commons; and section 45,
which allows provinces to amend their own provincial constitutions.
Electoral reform is not specifically mentioned in Part V, although a
couple of its provisions relate to the electoral system. Section 41(b)
mandates unanimity for any changes affecting the right of a province to a
number of members in the House not less than the number of Senators by

6
In addition to the five listed above, there are provisions allowing provinces to dissent
from amendments on certain issues and to receive compensation in certain cases (section 40).
Further, the Senate enjoys a suspensive veto for amendments made under s. 38, 41, 42 or 43, which
the House can override by adopting the resolution a second time 180 days after adopting the initial
resolution (s. 47).
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which the province is entitled to be represented at the time Part V came
into force. Section 42, which lists specific matters that may only be made
in accordance with the general procedure, includes section 42(a), specifying
changes relating to the principle of proportionate representation of the
provinces in the House. As will be discussed in this section, until recent
jurisprudence that narrowed the apparent scope of section 44, it was
widely assumed that electoral reform would generally fall under section 44.
The structure and rules relating to, or governing, Canada’s electoral
system are found in a mix of constitutional and statutory provisions.
Relevant constitutional provisions include sections 37, 51 and 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1867,7 which set out the number of electoral districts
(ridings) in each province or territory, detail the rules for readjusting the
representation of seats in the House, and permit Parliament to increase
the number of seats in the House, respectively. Voting rights and the right
to be qualified for membership in Parliament and provincial legislatures
are entrenched in section 3 of the Charter. Many of the more specific and
comprehensive rules pertaining to the electoral system are established via
ordinary statute. Detailed rules relating to the process and administration
of elections are set out in the Canada Elections Act,8 electoral districts
are established by proclamations issued under the Electoral Boundaries
Readjustment Act9 and qualifications and disqualifications of members of
the House of Commons are set out in the Parliament of Canada Act.10
Given this legal context, it might be thought that certain types of
electoral reform  particularly those that do not alter provincial seat
distribution in the House  are possible without recourse to
constitutional amendment at all. A move from FPTP to preferential
balloting (where voters rank candidates in their order of preference, also
known as alternative vote or instant run-off), for example, would not
necessitate any change to existing ridings, only to the rules about how
votes are tabulated. It is not clear why recourse to formal constitutional
amendment would be necessary to effect such a change, nor have many
commentators expressed an opinion to the contrary, at least until recently.
The Supreme Court’s two 2014 reference opinions pertaining to
constitutional amendment complicate this issue. In Reference re Supreme

7
8
9
10

30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
S.C. 2000, c. 9.
R.S.C. 1985, c. E-3.
R.S.C. 1985, c. P-1.
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Court Act, ss. 5 and 6,11 a 6-1 majority of the Court determined that the
eligibility requirements for Supreme Court justices as set out in the
Supreme Court Act12 were part of the “composition of the Supreme
Court”, changes to which are listed in section 41(d) as a matter requiring
unanimity. In effect, the Court constitutionalized parts of an ordinary
statute. Controversially, the Court’s opinion outlined a history in which
the Court’s existence and functioning engaged the interests of both
Parliament and the provinces before the institution was even entrenched
via Part V in 1982.13 Prior to 2014, the extant academic debate regarding
the Court’s constitutional status does not even entertain this notion, as it
largely concerned whether the Court was even entrenched after being
mentioned in the amending formula, given that Parliament created the
Court via ordinary statute under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
Some scholars believed references to the Court in Part V were limited by
the fact that the “Constitution of Canada” as defined in section 52(2) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 did not include the Supreme Court Act. Peter
Hogg noted that the “amending procedures are not required for the
amendment of statutes or instruments that are not part of the Constitution
of Canada; anything that is not part of the Constitution of Canada can be
amended by the ordinary action of the competent legislative body”.14
Other scholars disagreed.15
It is unclear what other parts of the Supreme Court Act remain normal
statutory law or are now, in fact, part of the Constitution. Moreover, it is
not clear whether other statutes, such as the Canada Elections Act, might
be deemed constitutionally entrenched in the future because they are
implicated by the amending formula.
The Court’s opinion in Reference re Senate Reform, issued one month
later, arguably means that certain provisions in the Canada Elections Act
11
[2014] S.C.J. No. 21, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 433, 2014 SCC 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reference
re Supreme Court Act”].
12
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26.
13
Reference re Supreme Court Act, supra, note 11. The majority suggested this occurred
with the abolition of appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1949, at para. 85, and
was further cemented by the end of appeals as of right to the Court in civil cases, at para. 86, writing
“Increasingly, those concerned with constitutional reform accepted that future reforms would have to
recognize the Supreme Court’s position within the architecture of the Constitution”, at para. 87.
This, according to the Court, was “confirmed” by the Constitution Act, 1982, at para. 76.
14
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Thomson Canada Limited,
2003), at 73.
15
Patrick J. Monahan & Byron Shaw, Constitutional Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2013), at 191; Stephen A. Scott, “Pussycat, Pussycat or Patriation and the New Constitutional
Amendment Process” (1982) 20(2) U.W.O. L. Rev. 247, at 272-73.
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are entrenched, or at least that the electoral system is fundamental to the
House of Commons as an institution and should therefore be regarded as
having a constitutional nature. In the Senate reference, the Court
elaborated on the Constitution’s “architecture”, a concept it had invoked
in previous cases,16 and which it described as “the principle that ‘[t]he
individual elements of the Constitution are linked to the others, and
must be interpreted by reference to the structure of the Constitution as
a whole’”.17 Constitutional amendments, the Court explained, “are not
confined to textual changes. They include changes to the Constitution’s
architecture.”18 The Court found that the government’s proposed
consultative elections for senators and senatorial term limits both require
provincial consent under the general amending procedure. Rather
than limiting their reasons on consultative elections to the fact that they
would constitute a change to the “method of selecting Senators” under
section 42(1)(b), therefore requiring recourse to the general amending
procedure, the majority also found that implementing consultative
elections would alter the constitutional architecture by changing the
essential functioning of the Senate and the role of senators.
The Court applied similar reasoning to its analysis of whether
enacting term limits for senators (notably, not mentioned in the amending
formula) could be accomplished by Parliament alone under section 44 or
required use of the general amending procedure. On the dividing line
between the two procedures, the justices emphasized that section 44, “as
an exception to the general procedure, encompasses measures that
maintain or change the Senate without altering its fundamental nature
and role.”19 The justices determined that existing senatorial tenure  an
appointment until the age of 75, or “the duration of their active
professional lives” is linked to the conception of the Senate as a
complementary legislative body of sober second thought.20 Therefore, a
significant change to senatorial tenure would alter the Senate’s role, and
can only be achieved under the general amending procedure.

16
Ontario Public Service Employees’ Union v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] S.C.J.
No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 57 (S.C.C.); Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61,
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reference re Secession of Quebec”].
17
Reference re Senate Reform, supra, note 5, at para. 26 citing Reference re Secession of
Quebec, supra, note 16, at para. 50.
18
Id., at para. 27.
19
Id., at para. 75.
20
Id., at para. 79.
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It is clear from the Court’s articulation of the constitutional architecture
concept that electoral reform could be regarded as a change of a
constitutional nature. The question then becomes whether Parliament has
the authority to make major changes to the electoral system without
provincial consent.
2. Does Federal Electoral Reform Require Provincial Consent?
The constitutional architecture concept generates considerable
uncertainty regarding the dividing line between the general amending
procedure and section 44, which allows Parliament alone to make
institutional changes to the executive or the House of Commons and
the Senate.21 One major problem with the Court’s approach is evident in
the example of senatorial term limits. In Reference re Senate Reform, the
Court explicitly refused to consider whether there might be a point at
which differently prescribed term limits  lengthy, non-renewable
terms, for example  would not fundamentally alter the Senate’s role.
“It may be possible”, the Court noted, “to devise a fixed term so lengthy
that it provides a security of tenure which is functionally equivalent to
that provided by life tenure. However, it is difficult to objectively
identify the precise term duration that guarantees an equivalent degree of
security of tenure.”22 By refusing to engage in line-drawing (which was
precisely what was being asked of it),23 the Court, even by its own
standard, risked unreasonably narrowing the scope of section 44.

21
For a more detailed critique of the Court’s logic in the Senate reference, see: Emmett
Macfarlane, “Unsteady Architecture: Ambiguity, the Senate Reference, and the Future of
Constitutional Amendment in Canada” (2015) 60(4) McGill L.J. 883.
22
Reference re Senate Reform, supra, note 5, at para. 81.
23
The reference question posed by the Governor in Council clearly contemplates that
certain term limits might be short enough to require provincial consent while others might be long
enough that their impact on the Senate would be relatively minor such that Parliament could
implement them unilaterally. In other words, the government was asking the Court to draw a line.
The question was written as follows:
1. In relation to each of the following proposed limits to the tenure of Senators, is it
within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada, acting pursuant
to section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982, to make amendments to section 29 of
the Constitution Act, 1867 providing for:
(a) a fixed term of nine years for Senators, as set out in clause 5 of Bill C-7, the Senate
Reform Act;
(b) a fixed term of ten years or more for Senators;
(c) a fixed term of eight years or less for Senators;
(d) a fixed term of the life of two or three Parliaments for Senators;
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A consequence of the constitutional architecture approach is a lack
of clarity over when provincial consent is implicated. The approach
effectively requires that the Court accurately describe the different
animating features of the various institutions and processes that make up
the constitutional architecture beyond the constitutional text. As a result
of this lack of clarity, some commentators have argued that the
constitutional architecture concept means that electoral reform can only
be accomplished via the general amending procedure.24 Michael Pal
writes that provincial interests in the federal electoral system might be
regarded as similar to their interest in Senate reform. He describes
provincial interests as follows:
Moving away from FPTP would affect provincial interests. The federal
government and the provinces have been fighting about provincial
representation in the House since its creation. Introducing pure
proportional representation, or a mixed-member system of the type
used in Germany, would dramatically alter Canadian politics. Moving
from the electoral system in place since 1867 would constitute
a fundamental change to the House and to the Constitution. The
implication is that Parliament likely can’t act alone.25

Pal concludes that major electoral reform, including changes to
proportional representation26 (“PR”) or mixed-member proportional27
(“MMP”) systems, likely requires the general amending procedure, but
(e)

a renewable term for Senators, as set out in clause 2 of Bill S-4, Constitution Act,
2006 (Senate tenure);
(f) limits to the terms for Senators appointed after October 14, 2008 as set out in
subclause 4(1) of Bill C-7, the Senate Reform Act; and
(g) retrospective limits to the terms for Senators appointed before October 14, 2008?
24
Michael Pal, “Why Canada’s top court must weigh in on electoral reform”, The Globe and
Mail (January 15, 2016), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/why-canadas-top-courtmust-weigh-in-on-electoral-reform/article28198932/>; Yaakov M. Roth & Jonathan E. Roth, “Liberals’
electoral reform plan is legally futile”, The Toronto Star (January 18, 2016), online: <http://www.
thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2016/01/18/liberals-electoral-reform-plan-is-legally-futile.html>. See
also: Michael Pal, “Constitutional Amendment After the Senate Reference and the Prospects for Electoral
Reform” (2016) presented at Osgoode Hall Law School Annual Constitutional Cases Conference.
25
Id.
26
Proportional representation includes a variety of systems that allocate seats based on the
percentage of seats cast. They include party list systems, which includes seat allocations from party
lists, or the single transferable vote (“STV”), which uses ranked-balloting in multi-member
constituencies to arrive at a proportional outcome.
27
Mixed-member proportional systems are a hybrid of district-based systems like FPTP and
party lists, where a portion of a legislature’s seats are allocated on a list basis as a top up to ensure a
more proportional outcome overall. Under MMP voters typically have two votes: one for a local
riding representative and one for the party list.
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that certain changes  such as preferential balloting  might be
interpreted as only trivially affecting provincial interests and could
possibly be achieved by Parliament alone.
It is clear that any electoral reform that departs from the basic principle
of proportionate representation for seats by province in the House would
require provincial consent under section 42(a). Similarly, any electoral
reform that would reduce the number of any province’s seats below their
constitutional guarantee under section 41(b) would require unanimous
consent of the provinces. Given the Court’s constitutional architecture
approach, even if these provisions were not explicitly listed in Part V it is
clear that provincial interests in their proportionate representation in the
House would be implicated by any reform to the electoral system that
seriously altered seat distribution.
Indeed, one significant reason that section 44 is the appropriate
procedure for federal electoral reform is the fact that Parliament has
previously used that procedure to modify the formula for apportioning
seats in the House of Commons, in 1985 with the Representation Act,
1985,28 and again in 2011 with the Fair Representation Act.29 Since the
apportionment of seats is directly relevant to provincial interests vis-à-vis
the House of Commons, it is notable that these amendments were made
by Parliament alone with little controversy. Any change, however, that
dramatically departs from the basic principle of proportionality, is
something that would implicate provincial interests and require their
consent. Therefore, assessing which amending procedure is implicated
depends not just on the matter at issue but the substance of the proposed
amendment and whether it directly affects provincial interests.
Pal has written that the 2011 Fair Representation Act does implicate
provincial interests and that, in light of the Reference re Senate Reform
reasoning, it may have been an unconstitutional amendment.30 He writes
that it “is hard to see how altering the formula for representation in the
House by province engages purely federal interests. The provinces are
keenly and directly interested in the number of seats they hold, the
proportion of the House this represents, and the impact of any relative or
absolute change in provincial population on their seat complement.”31
Importantly, Pal views the application of Reference re Senate Reform
28

S.C. 1986, c. 8.
S.C. 2011, c. 26.
30
Michael Pal, “Fair Representation in the House of Commons?” (2015) J.P.P.L. 35 [hereinafter
“Pal, ‘Fair Representation’”].
31
Id., at 47.
29
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logic to this context as an “unintended impact”, noting that the likely
effect would be to freeze the formula for representation  as provincial
consensus about a new formula would be difficult to achieve  and the
House would grow increasingly unrepresentative.32
Yet I would argue that this is precisely why a contextualist reading of
the Constitution’s protections for seat proportionality are fittingly within
Parliament’s amending authority under section 44, something Pal notes
was upheld in the 1988 case Campbell v. Canada (Attorney General).33
That decision affirmed that the principle of seat proportionality was
broadly defined to allow for deviations from absolute proportionality
given that smaller provinces enjoy guaranteed representation greater than
their populations would otherwise allow. Under a narrow or absolutist
understanding of the principle of proportionality, the constitutional
guarantee of four seats for Prince Edward Island, for example, would
simply not be possible without a massive (and arguably ludicrous)
increase in the number of seats in the House. A broader interpretation of
the principle is therefore consistent with the constitutional architecture
concept itself, given that assessing the underlying structure of the
Constitution in light of the amending formula requires a contextualist
understanding of its written and unwritten components and how they
interact and operate together. Provincial consent for changes to the
formula for apportioning seats in the House should thus only be required
when a proposed change departs significantly from historical margins or
constitutionally-mandated norms.
Further, provided that the principle of proportional representation for
the provinces is not disturbed, Parliament is given unequivocal authority
under section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to increase the number of
seats in the House. Pal suggests section 52 might itself be regarded as the
basis for unilateral amendment by Parliament of the authority to
redistribute seats under section 51.34
More significantly, it is not clear that provincial interests in federal
electoral reform extends beyond the proportion of seats they are afforded.
As in many bicameral federations, the very nature of representation as it
relates to the two houses, the House and the Senate, are functionally
different, with the lower house emphasizing representation of the national
32

Id., at 46.
[1988] B.C.J. No. 442, 49 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (B.C.C.A.), affg [1987] B.C.J. No. 3152, 21
B.C.L.R. (2d) 130 (B.C.S.C.).
34
Pal, “Fair Representation”, supra, note 30, at 49.
33
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will by population and the upper house representation by state, province or
region. Indeed, in Reference re Senate Reform, the Court emphasized
regional representation as an essential feature of the Senate, and as a key
aspect of provincial interests in the Senate.35
Provincial interest in electoral reform of the House, aside from seat
proportionality and seat floor guarantees as reflected in the constitutional
text, is much more tenuous. Pal is undoubtedly correct that major
electoral reform could dramatically alter Canadian politics and the
outcomes generated in the House. A move from a FPTP system to some
variant of PR would inevitably result in more minority governments or
the development of a culture of coalition governments, and changes to
the party system itself. However, as Leonid Sirota writes, electoral
reform would not affect the “nature” of the House of Commons as the
representative part of the national legislature, or its primary role of
holding the government to account under responsible government.36
Moreover, it is not obvious why changes to party distribution or an
increase in minority or coalition governments, however significant they
would be, implicate provincial interests in the same way changes to the
nature of Senate representation might. The role of the House is premised
on popular representation of the national will, just as the Senate’s role is,
in part, to ensure regional (provincial) representation at the national
level.37 These different roles and natures of representation reflect the very
function of bicameralism in a federation like Canada. If the Court is to
assess the constitutional architecture in light of a contextualist analysis of
the role and purpose of the central institutions  as it did in both 2014
reference opinions  then it needs to pay heed to not only when
provincial interests are at stake, but also when they are not.
If the provinces have a constitutional interest in any other aspects of
House of Commons representation, one might be the existence of
electoral districts assigned on a provincial basis, which are explicitly
contemplated by several provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867,
35

Reference re Senate Reform, supra, note 5, at para. 15.
Leonid Sirota, “Yes, They Can”, Double Aspect blog (January 19, 2016), online:
<https://doubleaspectblog.wordpress.com/2016/01/19/yes-they-can/>. For more on the distinct roles
of the House and Senate and their relevance for the amending formula, see also: Yasmin Dawood,
“The Process of Electoral Reform in Canada: Democratic and Constitutional Constraints” (2016)
presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference.
37
It is worth noting the Senate has arguably performed very poorly as a body that functions
to provide regional or provincial representation, but if anything that empirical reality undermines the
Court’s reasoning in the Senate reference rather than serves to apply it to the context of electoral
reform vis-à-vis the House.
36
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including sections 40 and 41, and arguably by the constitutional preamble,
which ascribes to Canada “a Constitution similar in Principle to that
of the United Kingdom”. Attempts to change the electoral system to one
that is not solely based on geographic electoral districts might constitute
an amendment that affects provincial interests.38
One problem with this suggestion is that sections 40 and 41 explicitly
provide Parliament with the authority to make changes in this area. For
example, section 40 reads as follows: “Until the Parliament of Canada
otherwise provides, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick
shall, for the Purposes of the Election of Members to serve in the House of
Commons, be divided into Electoral Districts as follows: … .” Importantly,
these provisions are regarded as spent. The dissenting judgment in the 1965
case R. v. McKay39 describes section 41 as “an interim provision” that was
exhausted after Parliament passed legislation to replace then-existing
provincial laws.40 The majority in McKay, however, approvingly cited the
1879 case Valin v. Langlois,41 which held that “the Parliament of Canada
has the exclusive power of legislation over Dominion controverted
elections. By the lex Parliamentariam as well as by the 41st, 91st, and 92nd
sections of the British North America Act, this power is as complete as if it
was specially and by name contained in the enumeration of the federal
powers of section 91.” Even if altering electoral districts is now thought to
require constitutional amendment because parts of the relevant statutes are
deemed part of the Constitution, these provisions, coupled with this
historical context and jurisprudence, lend much weight to the argument that
such changes can be accomplished by Parliament alone under section 44.

III. ELECTORAL REFORM AND THE CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
The democratic rights of Canadian citizens are listed in sections 3, 4
and 5 of the Charter. Sections 4 and 5 mandate that elections be held at
least every five years,42 and that there be a sitting of Parliament (and each
38

My thanks to B. Thomas Hall for proposing this argument in e-mail and on Twitter.
[1965] S.C.J. No. 51, [1965] S.C.R. 798 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “McKay”].
40
Presumably a similar logic explains why s. 40 is also regarded as spent. My thanks to
James Sprague for alerting me to this jurisprudence.
41
[1879] S.C.J. No. 2, 3 S.C.R. 1, at 71 (S.C.C.).
42
Section 4(2) provides an exception in time of real or apprehended war, invasion or
insurrection, so long as a continuation of the House of Commons or legislative assembly is not
opposed by more than one-third of the members.
39
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provincial legislature) at least once every 12 months, respectively. As these
are long-standing and uncontroversial rules, most relevant jurisprudence
pertaining to democratic rights takes place in relation to section 3, which
states that “Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of
members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be
qualified for membership therein.”
The courts have dealt with a variety of issues implicating section 3
since the Charter’s enactment. They have invalidated restrictions that
prohibit certain categories of people from voting, including judges43 and
prisoners,44 but have upheld residency requirements.45 The Supreme Court
has also upheld laws that advance equality of participation in the electoral
process in challenges to federal third party advertising legislation46 and a
ban on the dissemination of election results before polls in other parts
of the country closed.47 The jurisprudence under section 3 has been the
subject of much commentary, which I do not have room to examine here.
As Yasmin Dawood writes, the Court’s approach to section 3 reveals “a
bundle of democratic rights” that combine institutional and individual
dimensions.48 These various democratic rights have arguably been applied
inconsistently across cases, making it difficult to derive much predictive
capacity from the jurisprudence. Nevertheless, in this section I will argue
that the jurisprudence is sufficiently clear to conclude that, broadly
speaking, Parliament has wide latitude to implement electoral reform.
Three cases that are perhaps the most relevant for considering the
constitutionality of electoral reform involve electoral boundaries,49
restrictions on benefits for political parties50 and a challenge to the FPTP

43
44

Muldoon v. Canada, [1988] F.C.J. No. 1003, [1988] 3 F.C. 628 (F.C.T.D.).
Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519

(S.C.C.).
45
Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haig”]; Reference re Yukon Election Residency Requirement, [1986] Y.J. No. 14,
27 D.L.R. (4th) 146 (Y.T.C.A.); Storey v. Zazelenchuk, [1984] S.J. No. 800, 36 Sask. R. 103, 12
C.R.R. 261 (Sask. C.A.); Arnold v. Attorney-General of Ontario, [1987] O.J. No. 889, 61 O.R. (2d)
481 (Ont. H.C.J.).
46
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827
(S.C.C.).
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R. v. Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.).
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Yasmin Dawood, “Democracy and the Right to Vote: Rethinking Democratic Rights
under the Charter” (2015) 51(1) Osgoode Hall L.J. 251.
49
Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, [1991] 2 S.C.R.
158 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.)”].
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Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, 2003
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system in Quebec.51 At issue in Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries
(Sask.) were changes to electoral boundaries in Saskatchewan that
introduced quotas for urban and rural seats, resulting in significant
variation in the size and population of the ridings (ridings were permitted
to vary by up to 25 per cent of a “provincial quotient”, with the two
northern ridings varying by up to 50 per cent). A 5-3 majority of the
Supreme Court eschewed a “one person, one vote” rule, finding that the
right to vote “is not equality of voting power per se, but the right to
‘effective representation’”. The majority noted that while effective
representation includes parity of voting power as one of its principles,
absolute parity is impossible in practice, and that other factors, including
geography, community history and interests, and minority representation
“may need to be taken into account to ensure that our legislative
assemblies effectively represent the diversity of our social mosaic”. In
this context, the variance in riding sizes did not amount to a violation of
section 3. Importantly, the Court’s recognition of the legitimacy of
legislative consideration of other factors would no doubt apply to
electoral reform as well.
In Figueroa the Court struck down federal restrictions on benefits
to political parties that do not nominate 50 candidates to run in an
election.52 Writing for the majority, Iacobucci J. determined that in
addition to effective representation, section 3 also encapsulates a right to
meaningful participation in the electoral process.53 In so doing, Iacobucci J.
rejected the government’s argument that parties that run fewer than
50 candidates do not advance the objective of effective representation.
Instead, he characterized section 3 as “participatory in nature”,54 stating
further that “the electoral process has an intrinsic value independent of
its impact upon the actual outcome of elections”.55 Justice Iacobucci
stated that members and supporters of political parties that put forward
fewer than 50 candidates do play a meaningful role in the election
process, something which is not limited to a party’s ability to provide a
genuine “government option”.56
51
Daoust v. Quebec (Chief Electoral Officer), [2011] Q.J. No. 12526, 2011 QCCA 1634
(Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Daoust”].
52
The Court was unanimous on the outcome but three justices wrote concurring reasons.
53
Figueroa, supra, note 50, at para. 25. The concept was first recognized in Haig, supra,
note 45.
54
Id., at para. 26.
55
Id., at para. 29.
56
Id., at para. 39.
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A concurring judgment written by LeBel J. agreed with the general
thrust of Iacobucci J.’s reasons, but disagreed with how meaningful
participation is defined. Specifically, LeBel J. disagreed with Iacobucci
J.’s emphasis on the individual aspects of meaningful participation,
arguing that communitarian features, such as national representation and
inter-group alliances, were relevant.57 Justice LeBel argued that other
values relevant to the electoral process, including cohesiveness and
aggregation, ought to be recognized in the section 3 analysis.58
Justice LeBel cited the existing FPTP electoral system as “perhaps the
most significant example” of the constitutional relevance of these
values.59 He noted that while FPTP creates biases in favour of larger,
mainstream parties and “distorts” the translation of votes into seats, it
possesses virtues of representing broad communities of diverse interests
and creating stable majorities connected to the Canadian tradition of
responsible government, thereby fostering a strong political centre and
reducing factionalism.60 Importantly, especially in light of the question of
the electoral system’s consistency with section 3, LeBel J. wrote:
It should be emphasized that I do not intend to express any opinion
about the consistency of our FPTP electoral system with s. 3 of the
Charter. Any challenge to that system will have to be evaluated on its
own merits. Nor would I wish to give the impression that I consider
stability, majority governments or aggregation to be more important
than fair participation. Nevertheless, within the boundaries set by the
Constitution, it is the legislature’s prerogative to choose whether to
enhance these values over other democratic values, or not. Still less
should I be taken as suggesting that FPTP or any feature of the electoral
system that favours larger parties is constitutionally mandated. On the
contrary, I would argue that the government has a fairly wide latitude
in choosing how to design the electoral system and how to combine the
various competing values at play.61

Justice Iacobucci did not agree that it followed that the values
encapsulated in FPTP are necessarily embedded in the Charter or that
they ought to be balanced against the individual right to meaningful
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Id., at para. 101.
Id., at para. 153.
Id., at para. 154.
Id., at paras. 154-157. Justice LeBel acknowledges the highly contested nature of these
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participation.62 He noted that “the Charter is entirely neutral as to the
type of electoral system in which the right to vote or to run for office is
to be exercised. This suggests that the purpose of s. 3 is not to protect the
values or objectives that might be embedded in our current electoral
system, but, rather, to protect the right of each citizen to play a meaningful
role in the electoral process, whatever that process might be.”63 Instead, the
relevance of those values are, in Iacobucci J.’s view, a matter to be
addressed in reasonable limits analysis under section 1.64
Despite the disagreement over whether these competing values should
be balanced within the definition limits of section 3 or within a section 1
analysis, there is much to commend LeBel J.’s viewpoint that Parliament
would have wide latitude over the design of the electoral system. Indeed,
Iacobucci J.’s analysis would seem to support the same conclusion.
Although some have suggested that the FPTP system itself may
infringe section 3 rights,65 others believe that the existing jurisprudence
would generally tend towards deference to Parliament as it relates to the
design of the electoral system.66 This was precisely the result in a 2011
constitutional challenge to the FPTP system in Daoust.67 Drawing on
Iacobucci J.’s analysis in Figueroa, the Quebec Court of Appeal,
upholding the lower court judgment, rejected the claimants’ arguments
that the FPTP system prevented effective representation and meaningful
participation.68 Noting that no electoral system is perfect, Dufresne J.A.
concluded that “effective representation is not dependent on the electoral
system, and the evidence does not justify asserting that the first-past-thepost system that prevails in Quebec makes the representation of citizens
ineffective. On the contrary, the expert evidence tends to demonstrate
that every system has shortcomings. Therefore, it cannot be concluded
that the principle of effective representation is violated solely as a
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Id., at para. 37.
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function of the electoral system.”69 For an electoral system to be valid, it
“must confer on the electorate or assure it of a minimal, albeit significant,
degree of representation”.70
While current judicial reasoning relating to democratic rights
ultimately leads to the conclusion that the FPTP system is compatible
with section 3, it does not constitutionally mandate that system. Indeed,
the logic articulated by the Supreme Court in Reference re Prov. Electoral
Boundaries and Figueroa, and by the Quebec Court of Appeal in Daoust
would clearly apply to alternative electoral systems. To unreasonably
infringe democratic rights, changes to the electoral system would have to
hinder the right to vote by placing substantive or procedural obstacles on
the ability of individuals or particular classes of people to meaningfully
participate in elections; depart significantly from the principle of voter
parity (with variances more stark than permitted under the current system);
or substantially alter, in a manner that departs from basic principles of
democratic representation, the individual voter’s relationship with his or
her elected official(s).
Barring radical proposals that undermine effective representation or
meaningful participation  and it is difficult to identify any as it relates
to the most commonly cited alternatives to FPTP in the Canadian
context, including preferential balloting, MMP, or single-transferable
vote (“STV”)  Parliament should be free to implement electoral
reform. Party-list PR systems are not typically proposed for Canadian
electoral reform, in part due to the country’s regional diversity. It is
possible certain forms of PR could have implications for section 3’s right
“to be qualified for membership” in a legislature, given that a system
employing party lists would require candidates to run under party
banners for those seats.71 In a pure list system that included no seats for
geographically-based ridings, independent candidates would effectively
be shut out of the electoral process and would likely have a strong
section 3 claim. But in a hybrid system like MMP, independent candidates
would be free to run for riding-based seats while only being shut out of the
seats drawn up by party lists. This latter system might still constitute a
(marginal) limitation on eligibility, as it would restrict independent
candidates’ ability to run for office in relation to a specific set of seats. Yet
given the government’s likely articulation of its objectives in reforming
69
70
71
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the system  proportionality being at the top of the list, which would be
designed at least in part to improve vote parity  it is difficult to see
such a limitation not being upheld as reasonable under section 1.

IV. CONCLUSION
The authority of Parliament to implement electoral reform is arguably
cast in doubt by recent jurisprudence pertaining to the amending formula.
The Court’s elaboration of the scope of the general procedure relative to
section 44 in the context of amendments affecting the Senate creates
uncertainty and risks unintended consequences. In this article, I have
argued why Parliament’s authority to make changes to the electoral
system is, for the most part, in fact consistent with the constitutional
architecture concept and an understanding of the role of the House of
Commons as it relates to provincial interests. This argument is grounded
in an attempt to approach the issue of constitutional amendment from the
perspective of this recent jurisprudence and placing it in the context of
the Court’s own reasoning.
Nonetheless, the article has also briefly raised normative reasons why
a requirement for provincial consent under the general procedure would
be constitutionally inappropriate and undesirable.72 To briefly expand
on this normative dimension, I will address two key points. First,
interpreting the role or fundamental nature of the House of Commons in
a manner that imbues the provinces with a legitimate interest in the way
in which its members are elected arguably undermines federalism itself.
This argument may seem, at first blush, counter-intuitive. Despite my
criticism of the Court’s reasoning in Reference re Senate Reform, that
decision is properly hailed as supporting the federal character of the
country.73 Yet, as noted above, the upper chamber expressly provides for
regional (or provincial) representation as part of its core function. The
House is meant to provide for popular representation of the national will.
72
It is worth noting that arguments about the feasibility of electoral reform or the ability of
Parliament to implement it without provincial consent might correlate to individual’s normative
opinion about the desirability of electoral reform generally. In the interests of disclosure, while
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Although aspects of the House’s composition relate to regional
representation  the regional composition of cabinet is influenced by
the available members of the government caucus in the House, for
example  electoral reform will not in itself alter existing conventions
governing those features. This is in stark contrast to the impact proposed
consultative elections would have on the essential functioning of the
Senate.
Second, interpreting section 44 so narrowly as to exclude electoral
reform from its ambit would only cement the degree to which the
Canadian Constitution suffers from a paralysis. If provincial interests
extend so far as to negate Parliament’s authority in this context, it is
difficult to imagine a role for section 44 at all but for the most superficial
of changes. Such a reading, in my view, would also be inconsistent with
the history of constitutional amendment in Canada generally and the
plain meaning of section 44 specifically. The dangers of constitutional
stasis are obvious, but worth emphasizing. While core features of a
constitution should not be subject to the changing whims of ordinary
majoritarian politics, it should certainly not be so difficult to change that
its continued relevance and vitality for the functioning of good
governance stagnates over time. The inability to enact meaningful Senate
reform, despite the archaic nature of that institution, is a testament to
this. While clearly a product of both the amending formula itself and the
politics of constitutional change in Canada, the inability to enact reform
even in cases of deep and broad consensus is deeply problematic. The
courts must be cautious about further exacerbating this problem,
particularly when the amending formula itself embeds features designed
to provide for flexibility in relation to changes to central institutions.
A similar normative underpinning substantiates my argument that the
Charter’s democratic rights do not provide serious impediments to most
reasonable electoral reform options. As the courts have recognized, no
electoral system is perfect, and each balances different and competing
values and objectives. While the jurisprudence surrounding section 3
evinces an arguably piecemeal, rather than coherent, articulation and
application of the various democratic rights, the courts have
appropriately read those rights, including effective representation and
meaningful participation, as generally permitting a range of structural
alternatives in different aspects of the law of democracy. As it relates to
electoral reform, the courts owe due deference to Parliament’s weighing
of those competing values.

